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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES, an agency of the State of Utah, 
and UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
Respondents. 
Brief of Department of Workforce Services 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
Blauer's petition seeks review of the Career Service Review Board's 
(CSRB) June 28, 2006 decision on the merits and its July 27, 2006 order 
denying reconsideration. In his opening brief, Blauer asserts jurisdiction 
based only upon Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b) (West 2004), which confers 
jurisdiction on this Court over appeals from "the final orders and decrees 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies." As 
discussed in Point 1 below, however, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider 
CSRB's June 28, 2006 decision because Blauer failed to timely file a petition 
for review of that decision and his untimely request for reconsideration did 
not toll his time to file a petition for review. Although this Court does not 
have jurisdiction to review CSRB's decision on the merits, it does have 
jurisdiction over CSRB's subsequent order denying reconsideration because 
the petition for review was filed within 30 days of that order. 
Issues Presented 
1. Jurisdiction 
Because Blauer's petition for review was filed thirty-four days after 
CSRB's decision denying Blauer's employment grievance, the petition is 
untimely unless the time to file was tolled. Blauer had filed a request for 
reconsideration, but it too was untimely. Did Blauer's untimely request for 
reconsideration toll the time to file his petition? 
A. Standard of Review 
"[T]he initial inquiry of any court should always be to determine 
whether the requested action is within its jurisdiction. When a matter is 
outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the 
2 
action." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 
1989). 
B. Preservation of the Issue 
Questions of subject matter jurisdiction, because they are threshold 
issues, may be raised at any time and are addressed before resolving other 
claims. State v. Sun Surety Ins. Co., 2004 UT 74, f 7, 99 P.3d 818, 820. This 
issue is unique to the appeal and does not call for a review of the CSRB's 
decision. 
2. Substantial evidence supports CSRB's decision 
Blauer fails to mention significant evidence presented to the CSRB that 
supports its factual findings. Should the findings of fact be affirmed due to 
Blauer's failure to marshal? 
Blauer challenges CSRB's choice of competing inferences which could 
have been drawn from conflicting evidence and attempts to reargue the 
weight of the evidence. Should the factual findings be affirmed? 
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A. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews the findings of an administrative agency under a 
clearly erroneous standard. Drake v. Indus. Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 
1997). This Court will "generally reverse only if the findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence." Id. 
B. Preservation of the Issue 
This issue was considered by CSRB in its Decision and Final Agency 
Action. R. 864-71. 
3. CSRB correctly applied the law 
While on medical leave from his position with the Department of 
Workforce Services (Department), Blauer was approved for long-term 
disability benefits due to a psychological illness. After one year of medical 
leave, Blauer did not demonstrate that he had recovered from his 
psychological illness but instead asked to be returned to work with 
accommodation for a physical condition. The Department terminated Blauer's 
employment pursuant to a state personnel rule that requires termination if 
an employee cannot return to work after one year of medical leave. Did CSRB 
4 
correctly apply this rule in affirming the termination? 
A. Standard of Review 
Since this issue raises a question of general law, this Court reviews the 
"CSRB's conclusion for correctness, granting no deference to that agency's 
decision." Holland v. CSRB, 856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah App. 1993). 
B. Preservation of the Issue 
This issue was considered by CSRB in its Decision and Final Agency 
Action. R. 871-74. 
Determinative Constitutional 
Provisions, Statutes and Rules 
The following provisions are attached in Addendum D: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (West 2004) 
Utah Admin. Code R. 477-7-17 (2004) 
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Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case 
This is a petition for judicial review of final agency action of the CSRB 
that affirmed the Department's decision terminating Blauer's employment. 
2. Course of the Proceedings Below 
On November 3, 2004, Blauer was dismissed from his position as Legal 
Enforcement Counsel III with the Department. R. 895, Agency Ex. 7.1 The 
termination of Blauer's employment was based on his inability to return to 
work after taking one year of medical leave. Id. 
Blauer appealed the termination to the CSRB. R. 1. After holding a step 
5 evidentiary hearing, a CSRB hearing officer affirmed the termination. 
R. 677-91. Blauer then appealed the hearing officer's decision and CSRB 
conducted a formal appellate review of that decision. R. 856-75. CSRB issued 
its Decision and Final Agency Action on June 28, 2006, affirming the hearing 
officer. Id. 
Twenty-two days later, on July 20, 2006, Blauer filed a request for 
JBecause the exhibits received into evidence at the CSRB evidentiary 
hearing are not individually Bates-stamped, this brief will cite to them by 
referring to Bates number of the first page of the exhibit volume, R. 895, 
followed by the exhibit number. 
6 
reconsideration of the CSRB's decision. R. 882-87. On July 27, 2006, CSRB 
issued an order denying the request for reconsideration as untimely because 
it was filed more than twenty days after CSRB's Decision and Final Agency 
Action. R. 888-90. Blauer then filed the present petition for review on August 
1, 2006, thirty-four days after CSRB's Decision and Final Agency Action. 
3. Disposition Below 
By its decision dated June 28, 2006, CSRB affirmed the hearing officer's 
decision that Blauer's employment was properly terminated. R. 856-75. By its 
order dated July 27, 2006, CSRB denied Blauer's request for reconsideration. 
R. 888-90. 
Statement of Facts 
On October 8, 2003, Blauer went on medical leave. R. 893 at 10. Blauer 
then applied for long-term disability benefits and received a psychological 
evaluation as part of the application process. R. 895, Agency Exs. 1 & 2. In 
July of 2004, while still on medical leave, Blauer was approved for long-term 
disability benefits based upon a psychological illness. R. 894 at 292; R. 895, 
7 
Agency Ex. 4. 
While Blauer was on medical leave, the Department kept open his 
position of Legal Enforcement Counsel III. R. 893 at 79. Immediately before 
taking medical leave, Blauer's assigned responsibilities consisted entirely of 
conducting unemployment insurance hearings. R. 893 at 111-12. Ninety 
percent or more of these hearings were conducted telephonically with a 
speakerphone. R. 893 at 76. During any telephonic hearing, Blauer was not 
required to remain in a stationary, seated position but could walk back and 
forth or alternate between sitting and standing as he wished. Id. 
This assignment to conduct hearings full time was given only a few 
weeks before Blauer went on medical leave, and Blauer previously litigated a 
grievance where he argued that this assignment was a demotion. That 
litigation culminated in a decision by this Court that the reallocation of 
Blauer's job responsibilities to conduct hearings full time did not constitute a 
demotion to a lesser position, but was merely an extension of a core job 
function of the position he held. See Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2005 
UT App 488, n 32-36,128 P.3d 1204. Blauer's position was considered a 
sedentary position, both before and after his reassignment. R. 893 at 75. 
On October 1, 2004, the Department notified Blauer that his one year of 
medical leave would be ending soon and that, if he were able to return to 
8 
work, he needed to contact the Department and provide a medical release: 
Last year, you were placed on medical leave for a medical 
reason, and subsequently you were found eligible for the Long 
Term Disability Program (LTD). The Department of Human 
Resource Management rule R477-7-17(l) states that employees 
shall be granted up to one year of medical leave under these 
conditions. Our records show that your last day worked was 
October 8, 2003. 
If your condition has improved and you are able to return to 
work, please contact Wendy Peterson . . . so that we can arrange 
for your return. If you are still unable to return to work, your 
employment with the Department will be terminated. . . . 
You have until October 5, 2004[,] to contact Wendy and 
arrange for your return to work, or submit written documentation 
as to why your employment with the department should not be 
terminated at this time. If you are able to return to work, you will 
need to provide a medical release. 
R. 895, Agency Ex. 5 (emphasis added). 
On October 4, 2004, Blauer responded, through his attorney, by stating 
that his medical condition had not changed and that he remained disabled 
from conducting unemployment hearings full time. R. 895, Grievant Ex. 24. 
Blauer referred to his assignment conducting hearings as a demotion. Id. 
On October 8, 2004, the Department reiterated to Blauer that the same 
position he had occupied before going on medical leave was still in fact open 
and available for him to return to; the Department also advised Blauer of a 
pre-termination hearing that had been set since he had not yet returned to 
work. R. 895, Agency Ex. 6. At the pre-termination hearing, Blauer presented 
9 
no information that he had recovered from the psychological illness on which 
his long-term disability status was based. R. 893 at 61-62; R. 894 at 293. He 
presented no medical release stating that he had recovered from the 
psychological illness. Id. He did not even mention his psychological illness at 
all, but instead addressed only physical health issues. Id. Blauer wanted to be 
able to select his supervisor and wanted to unilaterally reallocate his job 
responsibilities to avoid holding hearings full time. R. 893 at 62. 
Because Blauer was unable to return to work, the Department 
terminated his employment on November 3, 2004. R. 895, Agency Ex. 7. Nine 
months later, at the CSRB step 5 hearing, Blauer testified that he was still 
receiving long-term disability benefits, that he still had not received a medical 
release stating that he had recovered from his psychological illness, and that 
he had not notified the provider of his disability benefits that he was no 
longer disabled. R. 894 at 294-95; 298. 
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Summary of the Argument 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to review CSRB's decision on the merits 
because Blauer's untimely request for reconsideration did not toll his time to 
file a petition for review. Because CSRB had no authority to hear the 
untimely request for reconsideration, that request did not suspend the 
finality of CSRB's decision and Blauer should have filed his petition for 
review within thirty days of that decision instead of within thirty days of the 
order denying reconsideration. 
CSRB's factual findings should be affirmed because Blauer has failed to 
marshal the evidence. In any event, the findings should be affirmed because 
they are supported by substantial evidence. Blauer's attack on the CSRB's 
findings lacks merit because it is merely an attempt to reargue the weight of 
the evidence considered by CSRB. Because Blauer had not recovered from the 
psychological illness for which he went on medical leave, CSRB correctly 
concluded that Blauer could not return to work and a state personnel rule 
required the Department to terminate his employment. 
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Argument 
1. Because Blauer's untimely request for reconsideration did not toll the 
time to file a petition for review, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review 
CSRB's decision 
A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time by either 
party or by the court. Weiser v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 932 P.2d 596, 597 (Utah 
1997). Without statutory authority to review the action of an administrative 
agency, this Court has no jurisdiction to review the agency action. Dep't of 
Envtl. Quality v. Golden Gardens Water Co., 2001 UT App 173,1113, 27 P.3d 
579. 
Absent an event that tolled the time to file a petition for review, 
Blauer's petition is untimely because it was filed more than thirty days after 
CSRB's Decision and Final Agency Action. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
14(3)(a) (West 2004) (requiring petition for judicial review be filed "within 30 
days after the date that the order constituting final agency action is issued"); 
Viktron/Lika Utah v. Labor Comm'n, 2001 UT App 8,117, 18 P.3d 519 
(holding that failure to timely file a petition for judicial review is a 
jurisdictional defect). The thirty days to file began to run from June 28, 2006, 
the date on the face of CSRB's decision. See Dusty's Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 
P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992). Instead of filing his petition within thirty days, by 
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July 28, 2006, he filed his petition on August 1, 2006, four days late. Thus, 
barring any event which tolled Blauer's time to file the petition, his petition 
was untimely and this Court lacks jurisdiction to review CSRB's June 28, 
2006 decision. 
Although Blauer filed a request for reconsideration, this did not toll the 
period to seek judicial review because the request was filed two days late. 
Blauer had twenty days from June 28, 2006, to file his request for 
reconsideration - until Tuesday, July 18, 2006 - but did not file Thursday, 
July 20, 2006. R. 882-87. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(l)(a) (limiting 
request for reconsideration to "[wlithin 20 days" of final agency action). 
Utah's appellate courts have held that a request for reconsideration tolls the 
time to seek review, but only in cases where the request for reconsideration is 
timely. See Bourgeous v. Dep't of Commerce, Div. of Occupational & Prof I 
Licensing, 1999 UT App 146, ff 11-12, 981 P.2d 414 (request for 
reconsideration was filed "within the twenty-day period permitted by 
statute"); 49th St Galleria v. Tax Comm'n, 860 P.2d 996, 998 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) (agency decision issued November 20 and request for 
reconsideration timely filed twenty days later on December 10); Orton v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 864 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (final decision 
entered September 4 and request for reconsideration timely filed twenty days 
13 
later on September 24). 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA)2 expressly requires a 
request for reconsideration to be filed within twenty days of the agency's final 
decision. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(l)(a) (West 2004). Regardless of 
whether a request for reconsideration is affirmatively denied on jurisdictional 
grounds, as it was here, or whether it is deemed denied by CSRB's failure to 
issue a ruling, an untimely request does not toll the time to appeal because it 
asks CSRB to do something it cannot do. Other than a good cause extension,3 
which was neither sought nor granted in this case, there is no basis in the 
language of UAPA or in case law for the notion that CSRB could hear or grant 
Blauer's untimely request for reconsideration. In fact, the plain language of 
UAPA - limiting a request for reconsideration to a strict twenty-day limit -
expressly foreclosed CSRB from considering the untimely request on its 
merits. 
Although Blauer's reconsideration request was only two days late, it 
was nevertheless outside UAPA's plain twenty-day limitation. Allowing an 
2UAPA consists of Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-0.5 to -23, inclusive. 
3The Utah Supreme Court has held that an agency's granting of a "good 
cause" extension to seek reconsideration will toll the thirty-day period to seek 
review. See Harper Invs., Inc. v. Auditing Div., Utah State Tax Comm'n, 868 
P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1994). However, Blauer did not request an extension and 
did not make a showing of good cause. 
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untimely request for reconsideration to toll the time to seek review would 
eviscerate finality in agency decisions. It would allow a party to indefinitely 
extend the time to seek judicial review, simply by filing an untimely request 
for reconsideration well outside UAPA's strict twenty-day limit. Blauer's 
approach interprets UAPA's deadline as meaningless. See Hall v. Dep't of 
Corr., 2001 UT 34, f 15, 24 P.3d 958 (holding court should avoid 
interpretations that will render portions of statute meaningless). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently observed that "we, like the court of 
appeals, can find no principled reason to treat agency petitions differently 
than other appeals." Harley Davidson v. Workforce Appeals Bd., 2005 UT 38, 
f 14, 116 P.3d 349. In keeping with that holding, the tolling implications of 
Blauer's untimely request for reconsideration should be the same as those 
raised by an untimely post-judgment motion under Utah R. App. P. 4. The 
situation here is equivalent to an appeal from a district court judgment where 
the notice of appeal is filed within thirty days of the disposition of an 
untimely post-judgment motion, but not within thirty days of the final 
judgment. In that situation, this Court would lack jurisdiction to review the 
underlying judgment because Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(1) tolls the appeal time 
only as to certain timely post-judgment motions. See Albretson v. Judd, 709 
P.2d 347, 347 (Utah 1985) (holding that because no tolling post-judgment 
15 
motion was filed within requisite time period after judgment was entered, 
time to appeal was not extended). Just as an untimely Rule 59 motion for a 
new trial, for example, does not suspend the finality of a district court's final 
judgment, an untimely request for reconsideration of an agency decision does 
not suspend the finality of the agency's decision because the agency is 
powerless under UAPA to hear that request. Accordingly, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to review CSRB's decision on the merits. 
2. CSRB's factual findings should be upheld because Blauer failed to 
marshal the evidence and because those findings are supported by 
substantial evidence 
A. Failure to marshal 
CSRB's factual findings should be affirmed because Blauer has failed to 
marshal the evidence supporting CSRB's decision. Before this Court "will 
subject an agency's findings to the substantial evidence test, the party 
challenging the findings 'must marshal all the evidence supporting the 
findings and show that despite the supporting facts, the [agency's] findings 
are not supported by substantial evidence.'" VanLeeuwen v. Indus. Comm'n of 
Utah, 901 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. 
16 
County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990)) (bracketed 
material in original). 
This Court has compared the marshaling process to becoming the 
devil's advocate, where the challenging party must present every scrap of 
competent evidence supporting the challenged finding: 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's 
advocate. Counsel must remove himself or herself from the 
client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order 
to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings the appellant resists. After 
constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the 
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The 
gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate 
court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly 
erroneous. 
Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724, 727-28 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (quotation marks 
and citation omitted, emphasis in original). 
Blauer has not only failed to present every scrap of competent evidence 
supporting CSRB's decision, but he has omitted considerable evidence 
supporting that decision. He omits significant evidence regarding the nature 
of his job duties, the nature of the position held open for him, and the 
requirement that he provide a medical release before returning to work. 
Moreover, much of his factual statement is argumentative, even the three-
17 
paragraph section ironically designated as the marshaling section. 
First, Blauer omits significant evidence of the nature of his job duties 
that supports CSRB's finding that the same position was held open for him. 
Blauer fails to discuss his previously litigated grievance and this Court's 
conclusion that the reallocation of Blauer's job responsibilities to conduct 
hearings full time did not constitute a demotion to a lesser position, but was 
merely an extension of a core job function of the position he held. See Blauer 
2005 UT App 488 at <H 32. 
Second, Blauer omits evidence of the nature of his job duties that 
refutes his claim that he had physical disabilities in addition to his 
psychological illness. For example, Blauer fails to mention that ninety percent 
or more of the hearings Blauer conducted were done telephonically with a 
speakerphone, so Blauer would not have been confined to a stationary 
position during the hearings but could have walked around or alternated 
between sitting and standing. R. 893 at 76. This omission is particularly 
egregious because the bulk of Blauer's argument that he physically could not 
conduct hearings full time is based on his assertion that he could not sit or 
stand very long in a stationary position. 
Third, Blauer omits evidence regarding his failure to submit a medical 
release. Blauer erroneously asserts that the requirement to furnish a medical 
18 
release was "not required of him as part of any pre-termination 
communication." Aplt. Brf. at 23. Yet the letter sent to Blauer on October 1, 
2004, stated: "If you are able to return to work, you will need to provide a 
medical release." R. 895, Agency Ex. 5 (attached as Addendum A). Blauer not 
only failed to produce a medical release, but he made no representations at 
his pre-termination hearing that he had recovered from his psychological 
condition or that he could obtain a release. R. 893 at 61-62. 
Because Blauer has failed to marshal the evidence that supports the 
CSRB's factual findings, those findings should be affirmed. 
B. Substantial evidence 
Even if Blauer has adequately marshaled the evidence, he has failed to 
show that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Much of 
Blauer's argument asks this Court to improperly substitute its judgment as 
between two reasonably conflicting views. EAGALA u. Dep't of Workforce 
Servs., 2007 UT App 43, f 16, — P.3d — (stating that this Court does not 
"substitute its judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even 
though we may have come to a different conclusion had the case come before 
us for de novo review") (citation and quotation marks omitted). But it is the 
provision of the agency, "not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, 
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and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is 
for the [agency] to draw the inferences/' Id. 
This Court will "generally reverse only if the findings are not supported 
by substantial evidence." Drake, 939 P.2d at 181. Substantial evidence is 
"that which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion/' Stewart v. Bd. of Review of the Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 831 P.2d 
134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla 
of evidence, though less than the weight of the evidence." Commercial 
Carriers v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 888 P.2d 707, 711 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, "[t]he marshaled facts 
should 'correlate particular items of evidence with the challenged findings.'" 
Neely, 51 P.3d at 728 (quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv., Co., 818 P.2d 
1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). This Court has stated that "we do not want 
an exhaustive review of all of the evidence presented at trial. Rather, we want 
a precisely focused summary of all the evidence that supports any finding 
that is challenged on the ground that it is clearly erroneous." Neely, 51 P.3d 
a t728n. l . 
As set forth below, CSRB's findings are supported by substantial 
evidence. 
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The position Blauer left was held open for him while he was on medical leave 
Substantial evidence supports CSRB's finding that the same position 
Blauer left was held open for him while he was on medical leave. This Court 
concluded in Blauer that the reallocation of Blauer's job responsibilities to 
conduct hearings full time did not constitute a demotion to a lesser position, 
but was merely an extension of a core job function of the position he held. See 
Blauer, 2005 UT App 488 at % 32. While it is true that his assigned duties on 
the day he went on medical leave were not the same duties he had before the 
reallocation, this Court's decision in Blauer renders that inquiry irrelevant. 
Yet, despite that decision, much of Blauer's brief is devoted to revisiting the 
irrelevant distinction between what his duties were on the day he went on 
medical leave and what they had been historically, before the reassignment 
addressed in Blauer. To the extent that Blauer's arguments rely on the 
erroneous factual assertion that he was not offered the same position, they 
are not grounded in fact and should be rejected by this Court. 
Because conducting hearings full time was a valid extension of a core 
job function and was not a demotion to a lesser position, that specific 
assignment was properly considered by the CSRB as the position to which 
Blauer would have returned, had he demonstrated recovery from his 
psychological illness. The Department presented unequivocal testimony that 
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his exact position was in fact held open for him during his medical leave and 
that he would have resumed the identical duties to which he was assigned on 
the day he went on medical leave. R. 893 at 79, 111. Because this evidence 
supports CSRB's finding that the assignment to conduct hearings full time 
was the same position he had left, that finding should be affirmed. 
Blauer went on medical leave for psychological reasons 
Substantial evidence supports CSRB's finding that Blauer went on 
medical leave for psychological illness. This finding is supported by evidence 
that Blauer was approved for long-term disability benefits for psychological, 
but not physical, illness while on medical leave. R. 894 at 292; R. 895, Agency 
Ex. 4. And although Blauer presented evidence regarding physical difficulties 
he had with sitting or standing for long periods of time,4 the Department 
presented conflicting evidence that Blauer's assignment to conduct hearings 
full time would not require him to sit or stand for long periods of time. R. 893 
at 76. Blauer could walk around or alternate between sitting and standing, at 
his option, during most of the hearings he conducted since at least ninety 
4Blauer claims at pages 9-10 of his brief that he went on medical leave 
because of a physical disability only, not psychological. In support of this, he 
cites only to R. 893 at 10, which contains the date he went on leave but not 
the reason. 
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percent of the hearings were conducted telephonically with a speakerphone. 
Id. Because the inference CSRB ultimately drew - that Blauer went on 
medical leave for psychological reasons - is supported by this evidence, it 
should affirmed.5 See EAGALA, 2007 UTApp 43 at J 16 (stating that this 
Court does not "substitute its judgment as between two reasonably conflicting 
views"). 
Blauer was notified of his obligation to demonstrate recovery from psychological 
illness 
Substantial evidence supports CSRB's finding that Blauer was notified 
of his obligation to demonstrate recovery from his psychological illness. As 
noted previously, the Department sent Blauer a letter before his termination, 
stating: "If you are able to return to work, you will need to provide a medical 
release." R. 895, Agency Ex. 5 (attached as Addendum A). Blauer implies that 
his failure to produce a medical release was merely a technicality that the 
Department should have given him a chance to remedy. But the medical 
release never became an issue in and of itself because Blauer never asserted 
5Blauer fails to include evidence of accommodations made by the 
Department for Blauer's physical condition before he went on medical leave. 
Based on the recommendations of the State ergonomic specialist, Blauer's 
desk was raised so he could stand at his desk; he was provided dictation 
equipment and an audio player so he could listen to recordings of hearings 
and dictate documents as he walked around his office. R. 893 at 77-78. 
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in the first place that he had recovered from his psychological illness. R. 893 
at 61. Furthermore, in implying that he could have obtained a release if he 
had just been given the opportunity, Blauer fails to mention that, nine 
months after his termination, he was still receiving long term disability 
benefits and still had not received a release - verbal or written - to return to 
work based on recovery from psychological illness. R. 894 at 294-95, 298. 
Blauer did not demonstrate recovery from psychological illness 
Substantial evidence supports CSRB's finding that Blauer did not 
demonstrate recovery from his psychological illness. Blauer erroneously relies 
on the October 4, 2004 letter from his counsel to assert that he in fact 
demonstrated recovery from his psychological illness. Because the letter was 
devoted to perpetuating Blauer's sophistic insistence that holding hearings 
full time was a demotion, the letter communicated little of anything. See R. 
895, Grievant Ex. 24 (attached as Addendum B). Neverthless, the letter 
stated that Blauer's condition had "not changed" and he remained disabled 
from conducting hearings full time. Id. Even if an inference could reasonably 
be drawn from this letter that Blauer had recovered from his psychological 
illness, CSRB drew the opposite inference. CSRB's finding that Blauer failed 
to demonstrate a recovery from his psychological illness is further supported 
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by Blauer's failure at the pre-termination hearing to even discuss his 
psychological illness. R. 894 at 293. The finding is likewise supported by 
Blauer's own admission that nine months after his termination he still had 
not received a release - verbal or written - to return to work based on 
recovery from psychological illness. R. 894 at 298. 
3. CSRB correctly applied the law 
A. Application of Utah Admin. Code R. 477-7-17 
CSRB correctly applied Utah Admin. Code R. 477-7-17 (2004), which 
required a state agency to terminate an employee who was unable to return 
to work after one year of medical leave: 
(1) An employee who is determined eligible for the Long Term 
Disability Program (LTD) shall be granted up to one year of 
medical leave, if warranted by a medical condition. 
(a) The medical leave begins on the last day the 
employee worked. 
(3) Conditions for return from leave without pay shall include: 
(a) If an employee is able to return to work within one 
year of the last day worked, the agency shall place the 
employee in the previously held position or similar 
position in a comparable salary range provided the 
employee is able to perform the essential functions of the 
job with or without reasonable accommodation. 
(b) If an employee is unable to perform the essential 
25 
functions of the position because of a permanent disability 
that qualifies as a disability under the ADA, the agency 
shall place the employee in the best available, vacant 
position for which the employee qualifies and is able to 
perform the essential functions of the position with or 
without reasonable accommodation. 
(c) If an employee is unable to return to work within 
one year after the last day worked, the employee shall be 
separated from state employment. 
As set forth above, CSRB correctly found that Blauer failed to demonstrate 
that he had recovered from his psychological illness. Because Blauer did not 
demonstrate that he was able to work, the plain language of the rule 
mandated the termination of his employment. Only if Blauer had 
demonstrated that his recovery from the psychological illness made him able 
to work would any accommodation due to Blauer's physical health have 
become an issue. Moreover, Blauer has failed to demonstrate that the two 
accommodations requested - that he be given a new supervisor and not be 
required to hold hearings full time — were reasonable accommodations under 
the Americans with Disability Act (ADA). See Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 
F.3d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that no ADA disability exists where 
plaintiff "merely cannot work under certain supervisor because of the stress 
and anxiety it causes" (citing Weiler v. Household Finance Corp., 101 F.3d 
519, 524-25 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also Frazier v. Simmons, 254 F.3d 1247, 1261 
(10th Cir. 2001) (stating that job restructuring accommodation that 
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eliminates the essential function of the job is not reasonable). 
B. CSRB's decision denying reconsideration 
By failing to brief the issue of whether CSRB correctly denied his 
request for reconsideration, Blauer has waived this issue. See Brown v. 
Glover, 2000 UT 89, ^23, 16 P.3d 540 (stating that, generally, any issues "that 
were not presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not be 
considered by the appellate court"). Blauer notes in his opening brief that 
whether CSRB correctly concluded the reconsideration request was untimely 
is an issue for this court to review, yet he fails to present any argument or 
analysis why the CSRB erred. Moreover, Blauer fails to specifically address 
whether his request for reconsideration was in fact filed twenty-two days 
after CSRB's final decision. 
In any event, CSRB correctly determined that the request for 
reconsideration was filed outside UAPA's twenty-day limit. As noted above, 
CSRB's decision on the merits was considered issued on June 28, 2006, the 
date it bore on its face. See Dusty's, 842 P.2d at 870. Blauer filed his request 
for reconsideration twenty-two days later, on Thursday, July 20, 2006. 
R. 882-87 (attached as Addendum C). But his request should have been filed 
within twenty days - by Tuesday, July 18, 2006. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-
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46b-13(l)(a). Since the request for reconsideration was brought two days 
outside the statutorily allowed time, CSRB correctly concluded that the 
request was untimely. 
Conclusion 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Blauer's challenge to CSRB's 
decision on the merits because Blauer's untimely request for reconsideration 
did not toll his time to appeal. CSRB's factual findings should be affirmed 
because Blauer has failed to marshal the evidence and because those findings 
are supported by substantial evidence. CSRB correctly applied the law in 
concluding that, because Blauer could not return to work after one year of 
medical leave, the Department was required to terminate his employment. 
Dated this /-I day of March, 2007. 
J. CLIFFORD PETERSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Department of Workforce Services 
28 
Certificate of Service 
This is to certify that I mailed TWO copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Department of Workforce Services to the following this "Zffi^-day of March, 
2007: 
Vincent C. Rampton 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH, PC 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Robert Thompson, Administrator 
Career Service Review Board 
State Office Building, Room 1120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
29 
ADDENDUM A 










J AMES C WHTIAKER 
Deputy Director 
October i, 2004 
Lorin Blauer 
460 North 900 East 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Dear Lorin: 
Last year, you were placed on leave for a medical reason, and subsequently were found eligible 
for the Long Term Disability Program (LTD). The Department of Human Resource 
Management rule R477-7-J7 0 ) states that employees shall be granted up to one year of medical 
Ifeave under those conditions. Our records show that your last day worked was October 8,2003. 
If your condition has improved and you are able to return to work, please contact Wendy 
Peterson at (801) 526-4334 so that we can arrange for your return. If you are still unable to 
return to work, your employment with the Department wDl be terminated. Termination of your 
employment under these circumstances does not affect your eligibility for rehire. In the event 
your condition improves later, you may reapply for any vacant positions avaflable within our 
Department. This action does not affect your eligibility to remain on LTD, which provides you 
with benefits that include monthly payments, medical insurance coverage, and service credit 
towards retirement. 
You have until October 5,2004 to contact Wendy and arrange for your return to work, or submit 
written documentation as to why your employment with the department should not be 
terminated at this time. If you are able to return to work, you wfll need to provide a medical 
rdease. 
If we do not hear from you, we will take you off they payroll in accordance with the DHRM rule 
cited above. We thank you for the work you have performed for the department in the past and 
wish you weD in the future. 
Sincerely, 
/bAnne Campbell 
Human Resource Director 
Utah! 
]40£a3J300Soo1k,SahUkcCJry.t^M))| 'Tc»cp^ m ™ * « 
A prow) wcaba of America1* Workforce Network* Eq»*) Opportunity Eapfoycf/frognuBS 
rtrrir A»CO 
ADDENDUM B 
ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS 
EST. l875 
TEL: 8 0 I - 5 2 I - 3 2 0 0 
FAX: 8 0 I - 3 2 8 - O 5 3 7 
I 7 0 SOUTH MAIN ST, SUITE I50O 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84IOI 
WWW.JONESWALDO.COM 
October 4, 2004 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
JoAnne Campbell 
Human Resource Director 
Department of Workforce Services 
140 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Lorin Blauer 
Our File 15632.0001 
I>eai" IV Is ('"'yiiipbc'll111 
This letter is to respond to your letter of October 1, 2004, concerning your attempt to 
terminate the employment of Lorin Blauer. 
Mr. Blauer's medical condition (as you are by now well aware) precludes him from 
performing the essential functions of the position to which he was demoted: Administrative Law 
Judge/Non-Juris Doctorate. Ilis condition has not changed, and he remains disabled from the 
ALJ position. 
Mr. Blauer is and remains able to perform the essential functjons of Legal/Enforcement 
Counsel HI, the position he occupied prior to demotion. It is his understanding, however, that 
this position is not available to him, and has in fact been filled by another employee. If this is 







Please be advised that the termination of Mr. Blauer's employment under the 
circumstances outlined in your letter of October 1, 2004, and given the foregoing, constitutes 




Vincent C. Rampton 





Tom Cantrell, Representative for Grievant 
National Administrative Law Advocates 
201 E South Temple. ^«- 721 
Salt Lake City, U*. :^ - : ! 5503 
Advocates @Tomcanti <. • • • 
Telephone: 355-2005 
BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
; ;;;;;,'; ;.; u i R, 
Grievant and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF : 
WORKFORCE SERVICES, : 
Agency and Respondent. : 
: REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION 
: OF 
: DECISION AND 
\L AGENCY AC! 
Case No. 9 CSRB 83 
Administrative Representative, i »-iii i amid;, for and on behalf of Grievant, Lorin 
Blauer, hereby submits to the Career Sen ice Review Board (CSRB), this Request for 
Reconsideration of Decision and Final Agency Action in accordance with I hah 
e 
: - . LtV.UlCS A c t . 
11ie Grievant appealed the termination of his employment in accordance with 
Utah Codef §67-19a-302 (I) which states: 
A career sewice employee may grieve promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, 
written reprimands, wages, salary, violations of personnel rules, issues concerning the 
equitable administration of benefits, reductions in force, and disputes concerning 
abandonment of position to all levels of [the] grievance procedure. 
G E f l W 
"UL 2 0 2006 u 
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
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The Grievant originally appealed various issues and on various grounds, which 
issues and grounds were limited by the Hearing Officer to the issues as set forth in the 
Agency's Motion in Limine which stated: 
The sole issue to be decided in this matter is whether Grievant was properly separated 
from state employment for failure to return to work within one (1) year after the last day 
worked. Utah Administrative Code R477-7-J 7 provides in relevant part: 
R477-7-17. Long Term Disability Leave. 
(1) An employee who is determined eligible for the Long Term Disability Program (LTD) 
shall be granted up to one year of medical leave, if warranted by a medical condition. 
(a) The medical leave begins on the last day the employee worked. ... 
(3) Conditions for return from leave without pay shall include: 
(a) If an employee is able to return to work within one year of the last day worked, the 
agency shall place the employee in his previously held position or similar position in a 
comparable salary range provided the employee is able to perform the essential functions 
of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation. 
(b) If an employee is unable to perform the essential functions of the position because of 
a permanent disability that qualifies as a disability under the ADA, the agency shall 
place the employee the agency shall place the employee in the best available, vacant 
position for which the employee qualifies and is able to perform the essential functions of 
the position with or without reasonable accommodation. 
(c) If an employee is unable to return to work within one year after the last day worked, 
the employee shall be separated from state employment. 
Wherefore Agency prays that it's Motion in Limine be granted. 
Though the issues were limited then to the above; the Hearing Officer allowed the 
addressing of the Agency's allegation, together with the Agency's evidence and 
argument, that the Grievant had failed under that rule, but refused to accept the 
Grievant's arguments or evidence that the Agency had failed under that rule (this is 
particularly odd because the Grievant had brought the complaint). 
The Hearing Officer did not make a finding of whether or not Grievant would 
have been "...able to return to work within one year of the last day worked..." if the 
agency had offered to place him in the position or even in the "similar Position" of Legal 
Enforcement Counsel III but not limited solely to the function of holding administrative 
hearings and whether Grievant was "...able to perform the essential functions of the job 
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[i . :nfbrcement Counsel III if i iot l imited solely to the function oi holding 
administrat ive hearings] with or wi thout a reasonable accommoda t ion . " 
I "he termination of Gr ievant ' s emp loymen t has apparen th Iven -ield b ) the 
CSK 13 01 i tl le g.i c 1 iiids that ill: le Gi ie\ ai it "failed to reti u i i to v '< m oecause tl le Gi ie (i ' < 
failed to submit a medical release that the A g e n c y thought he should have submit ted. 
I he Gr ievant ' s posi t ion that the state failed by not allow ing the reasonable 
I act that almost the ei itirety oi the 1 lour- long discussion before the C S R B in this 
representat ive 's argument in support of the appeal was focused on that issue as \ e ! A> 
the Gr ievant ' s defense v << M {!H \{H ?M ^ il-r*-vbi the Grievant remiss in the manm 
i him inn: ' '• n 
opportunity to respond or remedy. 
The C S R B and Hear ing Officer whol ly failed to address the quest ion as to why , if 
•*»< y- i *'u .il release was insufficient oi absent, did that justify a lerminal 'nn u< ( i n n HI* * 
'ill! in it mi ml v\ „II iiiiii},111 and nppnrlnintv In H\SJH mull oi i rmedy. 
Despite repeated attempts by the Grievant 's representative to address these issues 
in the hearing before the Hearing Officer and in oral argument before the CSRB, the 
CSRB and the H- . \; - .• << * y 
appeal tosii- . i- " . * . - . • • ' . ... Grievant's alleged J .. ,u ;*. m-i a medical 
release in a particular format was just cause foi termination of his employment, even 
though the Grievant and 1lis attorney and administrative representative did not realize that 
the oi i ei to i et urn to woi k as si ibi nit ted b;; - tl ie at toi :i :ie;; ' w as i iot si li I iciei it ai id tl ie 
Gi ie\ ai it was i iot i lotii led othei v\ ise oi w a:i J led oi tl ie consequences ii 1 ie • did i iot coi :i ipl) 
This failure of the C S R B and the Hear ing Officer to address such a fundamental 
claim or defense, is whol ly mystifying except for one possible explanat ion: Based on 
believe they have the jurisdiction to make a ruling relative to whe the r or not the state 
fulfilled its obligatioi % offer reasonable accommodat ion . If that is the case oi if there is 
some other reason the C S R B is not addressing the issi les as stated ] ie i eii i tl lat 
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reasonable accommodation was not offered or granted when requested, or why the 
Grievant did not merit a warning and opportunity to remedy the problem regarding a 
medical release, the CSRB should make that clear. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST 
The Hearing Officer limited the issues to the question of whether or not R477-7-
17 was violated by the agency or whether the Grievant had failed to fulfill his obligations 
under that rule. However the Hearing Officer did not address the Grievant's claim under 
R477-7-17 that the state, not the Grievant, failed by (1) not allowing the accommodation 
requested and (2) not notifying the Grievant that they believed he was remiss in not 
providing the form and style of medical release the Agency desired; and (3) not warning 
the Grievant that his alleged failure to submit such a medical release in the form desired 
was a terminable offence or would be construed as job abandonment. 
On appeal to the CSRB, the Grievant's representative argued that the Hearing 
Officer had not made a finding relative to the Grievant's charge that the Agency was in 
violation of R477-7-17 by not allowing him the reasonable accommodation that would 
have allowed him to return to the position of Legal Enforcement Counsel III that they 
claimed they were offering him; which reasonable accommodation was simply to 
restructure his job (or rather de-restructure his job) so he could continue to do his work in 
the way he had done it for decades - and for which he was NOT medically disqualified 
and for which he required little or no accommodation. 
We request that the CSRB (1) make now such a finding or ruling; or (2) remand 
back to the Hearing Officer for a finding or ruling or (3) allow this matter to be 
recombined with the original grievance which is now before the CSRB at step 5. 
Or, in the alternative, reverse their ruling and the decision of the Hearing Officer 
and grant Grievant's complaint; order Grievant returned to his position as Legal 
Enforcement Counsel III and order the Agency to offer the reasonable accommodation 
asked for, that is, the allowance of the Grievant to perform his historical duties as Legal 
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En! on cei tiei it Com n tc il ] 11 I it on i .- • ;liicli i 10 medical evidence has ever supported his 
disqualification. 
It is the Grievant 's belief ai id understanding that tl le purpose of the Career Service 
Review Board is to hear grievances of the career service employees and protect their 
lights at ( oicliiiH s III ififiu ,111 , IIIIIII illlins i asi how* H I llii.iill lliu i l.nnis of llir Slate against 
the Gi ievant, a career service employee, 1 iave beei i upheld while the claims of the 
Grievant against the State have been ignored. This can be remedied by granting the 
employee ' s grievance oi i en lai iding it back tc • step 5 an y :!! : j ::lei in: :;ig til itat it b e joii ic cl ' aill t 
tl :ie I in st I: lalf • :: I tl lis gi ie vance whicl :i w as dela> ed ii i tl le coin is lit it is now bef ore a 
hearing officer, it in sense to do that because this is, as this representative clearly 
demonstrated, and the record proves, the second half of the same case (the one 'M-U at 
:Jo|) S) which j>eiH >as anst % fiui :» ::»> i •. ^s. 
Respectfully submitted on behalf of the Grievant by: 
Tom Cantrell Date 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to and Request for 
Reconsideration of Prehearing Scheduling Conference Summary and Order was mailed via 
first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following this day of July, 2006 (copies also sent 
via email) 
Philip S. Lott, Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O.Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856 
Tom Cantrell Date 




63-46b-14C3)(a), 63-46b-15(2)(a). Bourgeous 
v. Department of Commerce, Div. of Occupa-
tional & Professional Licensing, 1999, 981 P.2d 
414, 368 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 1999 UT App 146. 
Licenses ®=> 22 
Civil rule giving three-day extension of time to 
take action if notice of required action has been 
served by mail does not apply to Administrative 
Procedure Act's (APA) deadlines for seeking ad-
ministrative review. U.C.A.1953, 
63-46b-12(l)(a), (l)(b)(iv); Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 6(e). Maverik Country Stores, Inc. v. In-
dustrial Com'n of Utah, 1993, 860 P.2d 944. 
Administrative Law And Procedure @» 722.1 
The 15-day time limit for filing motion for 
Industrial Commission's review of administra-
tive law judge's decision was mandatory and 
jurisdictional; Commission's jurisdiction termi-
nated upon expiration of time limit U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-82.55 (Repealed). Varian-Eimac, 
Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 1989, 767 P.2d 569. Admin-
istrative Law And Procedure ®» 513; Workers' 
Compensation G== 798 
4. Finality of order 
Where at hearing before Public Service Com-
mission it was concluded that quantity of water 
then developed was not sufficient to permit wa-
ter company, a public utility to make any more 
extensions findings were binding on water com-
pany, and when order contained restriction that 
no further connections could be made order 
controlled company's obligation to furnish wa-
ter to additional connections and if other affect-
ed property owners claimed an impairment of 
their rights by rulings made, their relief was by 
requesting a further hearing before Commission 
or by appeal and not having taken steps to have 
the order modified or changed same had effect 
of a judgment and its legality could not be 
attacked in proceedings brought by city to con-
demn property of water company. U.C.A. 1^43, 
76-3-23, 76-4-18, 76-6-14, North Salt Lake v. 
St. Joseph Water & Irr. Co., 1950, 118 Utah 
600, 223 P.2d 577 Administrative Law And 
STATE AFFAIRS 
Procedure <§=> 496; Administrative Law And 
Procedure <£=> 500; Administrative Law And 
Procedure <§=> 513; Administrative Law And 
Procedure 3> 658; Waters And Water Course* 
<S=*202 
5. Supreme court jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court lacked subject matter ju-
risdiction over challenge to legality of standby 
fees imposed by water company, in that there 
was no initial determination of standby issue by 
Public Service Commission followed by addi-
tional application for review or rehearing 
U.C.A.1953, 54-7-15, 63-46b-12, 63-46b-14 
Hi-Country Homeowners Ass'n v. Public Service 
Com'n of Utah, 1989, 779 P.2d 682 Watcn 
And Watei Courses <&=> 203(12) 
6. Preservation of claim 
Failure of workers' compensation claimant to 
raise claim that he was entitled to compensation 
for an additional 50% permanent partial disabil-
ity at original hearing precluded any review of 
such claim on appeal. Zupon v. Industnal 
Com'n of Utah, 1993, 860 P.2d 960. Workers' 
Compensation^ 1856 
7. Standard of review 
Issues whether event giving use to appeal 1J, 
employees at state training school was decision 
to discontinue hazard pay or effective date of 
discontinuance and whether employees filed 
timely appeal were questions of law to be decid-
ed under "correction of error" standard for 
reviewing decision by Personnel Review Board, 
hearing officer had no substantial expertise in 
area of personnel management; and determina 
tion of what constituted "event giving rise to an 
appeal" did not require application of basir 
facts from case. U.C.A.1953, 67-19-24 
67-19-24(l)(a) (Repealed). Taylor v. Utah 
State Training School, 1989, 775 P.2d 432., Ad; 
ministrative Law And Procedure &=> 513; .'Offi-
cers And Public Employees <§= 72.55(1) 
§ 63-46b—13. Agency review—Reconsideration 
(l)(a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which review 
by the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, 
and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency action, any party ma} 
file a written request for reconsideration with the agency, stating the specific 
grounds upon which relief is requested. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, tht filing of the request is not a 
prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the order. 
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the agency and one 
copy shall be mailed to each party by the person making the request. 
(3)(a) The agency head, oi a person designated lor that puipose, shall issue a 
written order granting the lequesl or denying the icquest 
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Note 3 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated for that purpose does not 
issue an order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for 
reconsideration shall be considered to be denied. 
Laws 1987, c. 161, § 269; Laws 1988, c. 72, § 23; Laws 2001, c. 138, § 18, eff. April 
30,2001. 
Library References 
Administrative Law and Procedure @=>513. C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Proce-
Westlaw Key Number Search: 15Ak513. dure §§ 166 to 173. 
Research References 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
; Emp. Discrim. Coord. Analysis of State Law 
§ 49:87, Declaratory Orders. 
HRS Fair Employment Practices § 68:44, De-
claratory Orders. 
HRS Fair Employment Practices 325,900, 
Utah. 
Notes of Decisions 
Ip general 1 
Appeal 8-
Filing 2 
Finality of action 5 
Jurisdiction 7 
Rules of civil procedure 4 
Timeliness 3 
Written order 6 
1,. In general 
. Administrative Procedure Act (APA) did not 
authorize employer to hie more than one re-
quest for reconsideration of decision of Indus-
trial Commission to deny extension of time for 
employer to petition for review of ALTs decision 
inri antidiscrimination hearing. U.C.A.1953, 
63-46b-l(9), 63-46b-16(4), (4)(h)(iv). Maverik 
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Com'n of 
Utah, .1993, 860 P.2d 944. Administrative Law 
And Procedure <S= 481; Civil Rights <^=> 1711 
2. Filing 
"Filing," as used in Administrative Procedure 
Act's (APA) deadlines for seeking administrative 
review, requires actual delivery of necessary 
(loeuments to agency within 30-day time limit; 
inailing within that time limit is insufficient. 
U&A.1953, 63-46b-12(l)(b)(iv); Rules Civ. 
Proe., Rule 6(e). Maverik Country Stores, Inc. 
V.'Industrial Com'n of Utah, 1993, 860 P.2d 
944. Administrative Law And Procedure @=> 
722tt-
3. nTimeliness 
^Complaint seeking judicial review of decision 
^Department of Commerce denying applica-
tion >for professional engineer's license was 
timely, though it was filed over 30 days after 
Agency review ruling affirming the original li-
cense denial, where applicant requested agenc> 
reconsideration within 20 days of that ruling, 
department issued order memorializing its deni-
al of that request, and applicant sought judicial 
review within 30 days of that order. U.C.A. 
1953, 63-46b-12, 63-46b-13(l)(a), 
63-46b-14(3)(a), 63-46b-15(2)(a). Bourgeous 
v. Department of Commerce, Div. of Occupa-
tional & Professional Licensing, 1999, 981 P.2d 
414, 368 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 1999 UT App 146. 
Licenses ®=> 22 
For purposes of determining timeliness of 
complaint seeking judicial review of agency de-
cision denying application for professional li-
cense, applicant's request for reconsideration 
would have been considered denied 20 days 
after he filed his request if agency had failed to 
issue an order in response. U.C.A.1953, 
63-46b-13(3)(b), 63-46b-14(3)(a). Bourgeous 
v. Department of Commerce, Div. of Occupa-
tional & Professional Licensing, 1999, 981 P.2d 
414, 368 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 1999 UT App 146. 
Licenses <&=> 22 
Fact that State Tax Commission took no ac-
tion for over 20 days on taxpayers' petition for 
reconsideration of decision assessing sales taxes 
did not compel finding, under statute providing 
that such petition is deemed denied if no action 
is taken by Commission within 20 days, that 
30-day period for seeking judicial review of 
decision assessing sales taxes began 20 days 
after petition was filed, where Commission ulti-
mately issued order denying petition for recon-
sideration; actual date of issuance of order 
marked beginning of 30-day period. U.C.A. 
1953, 63-46b-13(3)(b), 63-46b-14(3)(a). Har-
per Investments, Inc. v. Auditing Div., Utah 
State Tax Com'n, 1994, 868 P.2d 813. Taxation 
<©=> 1318 
Fact that taxpayers filed request for judicial 
review of State Tax Commission decision as-
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R477-7 Leave 
(5) If the employee is unable to retun 11c: work witl fin 12 months, tl le employee shall be 
separated Iron i slate employment. 
(6) An employee who file; a iniuciuierit workers compensation clann sitall be disciplined 
according lo tf =*- jprovisions of H477-11. 
7-17 Long Term Disability Leave. 
(1) An employee who is determined eligible for the Long 1 erm Disability Progran t (I I ID) shall be 
granted up to one year of medical leave, if warranted by a medical condition. 
(a) The medical leave begins on the last day the employee worked. L I D requires a 
three month waiting period before benefit payments begin. During this period, an 
employee may use available sick arid converted sick leave. When those balances 
are exhausted, an employee may use other leave balances available. 
(b) An employee determined eligible for Long Ten11 Disability benefits, after the tliree 
month waiting period, shall be eligible for health insurance benefits beginning two 
months after the last day worked. The employee is responsible for the employee 
share of the premium durir ig tl ie two i nor tths following the last day worked. The 
health insurance benefit shall continue without premium payment for up to 22 
months or until eligibility for Medicare or Medicaid, whichever occurs first. After 22 
moi ?*.. iJ * health insurance may be continued with premiums being paid in 
accoiUcint e with I TD policy and practice 
Upon approval of the L TD claim 
(i) Biweekly salary payments that the employee may be receiving shall cease. 
If the employee received any salary payments after the three month waiting 
period, the I TD benefit shall be offset by the amount received. 
(ii) i ne employee shall be paid for ren laining balances of ar II lual leave, 
compensatory hours and excess hours in a lump sum payment. This 
payment shall be made at the time LTD is approved unless the employee 
requests in writing to receive it upon separation from state employment. No 
reduction of the LTD payment shall be made to offset this payment. If the 
employee returns to work prior to one year after the last day worked, the 
employee has the option of buying back annual leave at the current hourly 
rate.,. 
(iii) An employee with a converted sick leave balance at the time of LTD 
eligibility shall have the option to receive a lump sum payout of all or part of 
the balance or to keep the balance intact to pay for health and life 
insurance upon retirement. The payout shall be at the rate at the time of 
S TD eligibility. 
(r ) , !\i i employee who retires from state govern.' *-t ;•
 ( ; \\} - t ][ • mn\ be 
eligible for up to five years health and life ins tance as pu >vided m 
Subsection 67-19-14(2)(b)(ii). 
(v) I inused sick leave balance shall remain intact until the employee retires Ai 
retirement, the employee shall be eligible for the cash payout and the 
R477-7 Leave 
purchase of health and life insurance as provided in Subsection 67-19 
14(2)(c)(i) 
(2) An employee shall continue to accrue service credit for retirement purposes while receiving 
long term disability benefits 
(3) Conditions for return from leave without pay shall include 
(a) If an employee is able to return to work within one year of the last day worked, the 
agency shall place the employee in the previously held position or similar position in 
a comparable salary range provided the employee is able to perlorm the essential 
functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation 
(b) If an employee is unable to perform the essential functions of the position because 
of a permanent disability that qualifies as a disability under the ADA, the agency 
shall place the employee in the best available, vacant position for which the 
employee qualifies and is able to perlorm the essential functions of the position with 
or without reasonable accommodation 
(c) If an employee is unable to return to work within one year after the last day worked, 
the employee shall be separated from state employment 
(4) An employee who files a fraudulent long term disability claim shall be disciplined according 
to the provisions of R477-11 
7-18. Leave Bank. 
With the approval of the agency head, agencies may establish a leave bank program as follows 
(1) Only annual leave, excess hours, compensatory time earned by an FLSA nonexempt 
employee, and converted sick leave hours may be donated to a leave bank 
(2) Only employees of agencies with approved leave bank programs may donate leave hours to 
another agency with a leave bank program, if mutually agreed on by both agencies 
(3) An employee may not receive donated leave until all individually accrued leave is used 
(4) Leave shall be accrued if an employee is on sick leave donated from an approved leave 
bank program 
7-19. Policy Exceptions. 
The Executive Director, DHRM, may authorize exceptions to the provisions of this rule consistent 
withR477-2-3(1) 
KEY: holidays, leave benefits, vacations 
July 1,2003 
49-9-203 
63-13-2 
67-19-6 
67-19-12.9 
67-19-14.5 
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